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Abstract
We examine a two-sector real business cycle model with sector-speciﬁce x -
ternalities in the production of distinct consumption and investment goods. In
addition, the household utility is postulated to exhibit no income eﬀect on the
demand for leisure. Unlike in the one-sector counterpart, we show that equi-
librium indeterminacy can result with suﬃciently high returns-to-scale in the
production of investment goods. We also ﬁnd that the smaller the labor supply
elasticity, the lower the threshold level of returns-to-scale needed for generating
indeterminacy and sunspots. This ﬁnding turns out to be exactly the opposite
of that in all existing RBC-based indeterminacy studies.
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Starting with the work of Benhabib and Farmer (1994) and Farmer and Guo (1994),
there is now an extensive macroeconomic literature that explores indeterminacy and
sunspots in the real business cycle (RBC) model.1 The original Benhabib-Farmer-
Guo one-sector economy, with a Cobb-Douglas production function and suﬃciently
strong increasing returns, displays multiple equilibria and belief-driven business cy-
cle ﬂuctuations when the separable household utility is logarithmic in consumption
and convex in hours worked. More recently, Meng and Yip (2008) and Jaimovich
(2008) (hereafter MYJ) have shown that a one-sector RBC model, instead with non-
separable preferences, always exhibits saddle-path stability and equilibrium unique-
ness when there is no income eﬀect on the demand for leisure, regardless of the degree
of aggregate returns-to-scale in production. MYJ’s result illustrates the critical im-
portance of the income eﬀect associated with the household’s labor supply decision
in generating indeterminacy and sunspots within one-sector RBC models.
In this paper, we build upon MYJ’s analyses and examine the quantitative interre-
lations between equilibrium indeterminacy and the no-income-eﬀect utility function
in a two-sector RBC model. Distinct consumption and investment goods are pro-
duced with sector-speciﬁc productive externalities al aBenhabib and Farmer (1996)
and Harrison (2001). Our main ﬁndings are summarized as follows. First, unlike
in MYJ’s one-sector model, our two-sector economy may exhibit an indeterminate
steady state, and thus a continuum of stationary perfect-foresight equilibria, when
suﬃciently strong externalities are present. Intuitively, in order for equilibrium in-
determinacy to occur in any dynamic general equilibrium macroeconomic model, the
associated ﬁrst-order conditions must continue to hold when there is a change in
non-fundamental expectations. In particular, the household’s intertemporal euler
equation equates the shadow value of capital sacriﬁced this period in order to con-
sume — this period’s marginal utility of consumption — to the discounted utility value
of capital gained next period — its gross rate of return weighted by the marginal
utility of next period’s consumption. Therefore, upon the expectation of a higher
1See Benhabib and Farmer (1999) for an excellent survey. With the noted exceptions of Benhabib
and Nishimura (1998), and Benhabib, Meng and Nishimura (2000), most studies in this literature
postulate constant returns-to-scale at the individual ﬁrm level. We also maintain this assumption
throughout our analysis.
1return on capital in the future, agents will consume and work more next period. In
the MYJ economy, this expectation cannot be self-fulﬁlled, because any increase in
labor hours that may raise the gross return on capital will actually decrease its net
return by reducing the marginal utility of consumption. In our model, however, next
period’s net return on capital also dependsp o s i t i v e l yo ni t sp r i c e ,w h i c hi n c r e a s e s
when future consumption rises. Therefore, the same increase in hours worked can in
fact lead to the anticipated hike in the return on capital.
Second, we ﬁnd that a necessary and suﬃcient condition for indeterminacy and
sunspots in our model is suﬃciently strong increasing returns-to-scale in the invest-
ment sector. The intuition for this result is the same as in the separable preference
set-up of Harrison (2001): when agents anticipate that the return on capital will in-
crease tomorrow, they need incentive to give up consumption today for more capital
accumulation. As long as they will be rewarded with productive investment, in the
form of suﬃcient increasing returns in that sector, it will be worthwhile for them to
do so.
Third, and perhaps most surprising, the degree of increasing returns-to-scale re-
quired for our model to exhibit multiple equilibria increases with the household’s
labor supply elasticity. In other words, the smaller the labor supply elasticity, the
lower the threshold level of investment externalities needed to produce equilibrium
indeterminacy. This ﬁnding is exactly the opposite of that in all existing RBC-based
indeterminacy studies, where an inﬁnitely elastic labor supply is often adopted. The
reason is that, to fulﬁll agents’ optimistic expectations in our model economy, and
satisfy the household’s intertemporal euler equation, movements in labor hours across
t i m ep e r i o d sm u s tb ek e p ts m a l l . Al a r g ei n c r e a s ei nh o u r sw o r k e dc a nr e d u c et h e
overall future return on capital by reducing next period’s marginal utility of consump-
tion. Therefore, the smaller the labor supply elasticity, the easier indeterminacy and
sunspots are to obtain, in that lower returns-to-scale in production are needed. In a
calibrated version of our model, we ﬁnd that equilibrium indeterminacy is rendered
impossible when the labor supply elasticity is higher than 2.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model.
Section 3 examines the model’s local stability properties and presents quantitative
results. Section 4 concludes.
22T h e E c o n o m y
Our model incorporates a no-income-eﬀect preference into the discrete-time two-
sector real business cycle (RBC) model as in Harrison (2001). Households live for-
ever, and derive utility from consumption and leisure. The production side of the
economy consists of two sectors, consumption and investment. For expositional sim-
plicity, ﬁrms in each sector produce output using identical technologies, but subject
to distinct sector-speciﬁc external eﬀects. We assume that there are no fundamental
uncertainties present in the economy.
2.1 Firms




ct , 0 <α<1, (1)
where Kct and Lct are the capital and labor inputs used in the production of consump-
tion goods. In addition, At represents productive externalities that each individual





¤θc ,θ c ≥ 0, (2)
where ¯ Kct and ¯ Lct denote the economy-wide average capital and labor used in produc-
ing the consumption good, and θc measures the degree of sector-speciﬁc externalities
in the consumption sector.









Here, KIt and LIt are capital and hours worked in the investment sector, and Bt
represents a productive externality that is an increasing function of the economy-wide
average levels of productive capital and labor devoted to producing investment goods.
As in Harrison (2001), the degree of sector-speciﬁc externalities in the investment
sector, denoted as θI, is allowed to diﬀer from that for consumption θc.
Under the assumptions that factor markets are perfectly competitive and that
capital and labor inputs are perfectly mobile across the two sectors, the ﬁrst-order















where rt is the rental rate of capital, wt is the real wage rate, and pt denotes the price
of investment relative to consumption goods.
2.2 Households
There is a unit measure of identical inﬁnitely-lived households, each with one unit of












, 0 <β<1,χ ≥ 0 and Λ > 0, (6)
where Ct and Lt are the representative household’s consumption and hours worked,
β is the discount factor, and χ is the inverse of the wage elasticity of labor supply.
The budget constraint faced by the representative household is
Ct + ptIt = Yt = rtKt + wtLt, (7)
where It is gross investment, Yt is GDP and Kt is the household’s capital stock. The
law of motion for the capital stock is given by
Kt+1 =( 1− δ)Kt + It,K 0 given, (8)
where δ ∈ (0,1) is the capital depreciation rate.
The ﬁrst-order conditions for the household’s optimization problem are
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4where (9) equates the slope of the household’s indiﬀerence curve to the real wage.
Note that this equation illustrates the lack of income eﬀect associated with the house-
hold’s labor supply decision, as Ct is missing. It follows that the income elasticity of
intertemporal substitution in hours worked (or leisure) is zero. Moreover, (10) is the
standard consumption Euler equation, and (11) is the transversality condition.
Our goal is to examine the local stability properties of the steady state of the above
model economy. Before proceeding further, it is useful to obtain an understanding of
the implications of incorporating the no-income-eﬀect utility function. In particular,
Benhabib and Farmer (1994, 1996), Farmer and Guo (1994) and Harrison (2001),
among many others, adopt standard separable preferences





,χ ≥ 0 and A>0; (12)







Here, the income and substitution eﬀects can be separated. An increase in the real
wage, holding consumption constant, will raise Lt — the substitution eﬀect. An in-
crease in consumption, however, leads to a fall in Lt —t h ei n c o m ee ﬀect. In all
RBC-based models, the real wage and consumption are procyclical: they move to-
gether with output. In addition, in these models, the substitution eﬀect dominates,
so that when wt and Ct increase, so does Lt.
In our model, the ﬁrst-order condition for hours worked is equation (9), where
t h e r ei sn oi n c o m ee ﬀect to counteract the substitution eﬀect. As a result, when the
real wage (and consumption) increases, Lt rises by more than that in (13).
2.3 Equilibrium and Local Dynamics
We focus on symmetric perfect-foresight equilibria which consist of a set of prices
{pt,r t,w t}∞
t=0 and quantities {Ct,L t,K t+1}∞
t=0 that satisﬁes the household’s and ﬁrms’
ﬁrst-order conditions. Moreover, the aggregate consistency condition requires that
Kct = ¯ Kct,L ct = ¯ Lct,K It = ¯ KIt and LIt = ¯ LIt, for all t. The equalities of demand
by households and supply by ﬁrms in the consumption and investment sectors are
given by Ct = Yct and It = YIt. Finally, both the capital and labor markets clear
5whereby
Kct + KIt = Kt, (14)
Lct + LIt = Lt. (15)
It is straightforward to show that our model possesses a unique interior steady
state. We then take log-linear approximations to the equilibrium conditions in a








, ˆ K0 given, (16)
where hat variables denote percentage deviations from their steady-state values, and J
is the Jacobian matrix of partial derivatives of the transformed dynamic system. The
model exhibits saddle-path stability and equilibrium uniqueness when one eigenvalue
of J lies inside and the other outside the unit circle. When both eigenvalues are
outside the unit circle, the steady state is indeterminate and thus a sink. When both
eigenvalues are inside the unit circle, the steady state becomes a totally unstable
source.
3 Local Stability Properties
As discussed earlier, MYJ show that equilibrium indeterminacy cannot result in the
one-sector version of the above model. This section quantitatively examines the local
stability properties in our two-sector setting. It turns out that the ﬁrst result clearly
distinguishes our model from MYJ.
Result 1: In sharp contrast to MYJ, indeterminate equilibria result in our model
with suﬃciently high returns-to-scale.
The exact meaning of “suﬃciently high” will be made clear below. As demon-
strated by MYJ, in the one-sector version of our model, equilibrium indeterminacy
is not possible regardless of the degree of aggregate returns-to-scale in production.
What is diﬀerent here? The answer lies in recalling the intratemporal ﬁrst-order
condition with respect to labor supply, (9), and comparing the intertemporal euler




























= β[rt+1 +( 1− δ)]. (18)
In order for equilibrium indeterminacy to occur in either economy, the relevant
euler equation must be satisﬁed when there is a change in non-fundamental expec-
tations. For example, starting from the steady state, upon an expected increase in
the marginal return on capital, agents sacriﬁce consumption this period in order to
invest more today. Therefore, Ct falls while kt+1. increases. This enables agents to
consume more in period t +1 : Ct+1 rises. However, due to the lack of income eﬀect,
as seen in (9), Lt remains unchanged, while the increase in kt+1 l e a d st oar i s ei n
Lt+1, via the ﬁrms’ labor demand. The latter has two counteracting eﬀects in the
euler equations. First, the bigger (smaller) the increase in Lt+1, the smaller (bigger)
the increase of the left-hand side. Second, the bigger (smaller) the increase in Lt+1,
the larger (smaller, or a decrease may occur) the rise in the real interest rate, rt+1.I n
MYJ’s one-sector model with (18), these two eﬀects render the equality impossible.
With Ct falling and Ct+1 rising, a large increase in Lt+1 is needed for rt+1 and the
right-hand side to rise. But this would then decrease the left-hand side. At the same
time, if the increase in Lt+1 is small, keeping the left-hand side high, rt+1 and the
right-hand side cannot rise enough.
However, in our two-sector model with (17), movements of productive resources
aﬀect the relative price of investment. In particular, as Benhabib and Farmer (1996)
and Harrison (2001) have explained, due to the presence of increasing returns-to-scale,
the social PPF showing the trade-oﬀ between consumption and investment is convex
to the origin. This implies that the shifting of resources towards the production of
a good raises the marginal product of each factor used in its production, and lowers
the price of that good. Hence, upon agents’ optimistic expectations, the shift away
from consumption in period t lowers the relative price of investment, pt; and the shift
toward consumption in period t+1increases pt+1. It follows that small movements in
7Lt+1 that increase the left-hand side of (17) can also lead to a rise in the right-hand
side even though the marginal product of capital may not rise (or rise enough).
Our second result is reminiscent of Harrison (2001):
Result 2: A necessary and suﬃcient condition for equilibrium indeterminacy is a
suﬃc i e n t l yh i g hv a l u eo fθI, the degree of productive externality in investment.
The reason is the same as in Harrison (2001). When agents expect the return
on capital to increase tomorrow, they need incentive to give up consumption today
for more capital accumulation. As long as they will be rewarded with productive
investment, in the form of increasing returns in that sector, it will be worthwhile for
them to do so. In other words, it is the return on capital that agents care about,
and so their expectation of its increase is fulﬁlled when there are suﬃciently high
returns-to-scale in the production of investment goods.
Result 2 allows us to set θc =0for the following quantitative analyses. We
calibrate the rest of the model economy using parameter values consistent with post-
war US data. Each period in the model is taken to be one quarter. As is common in
the real business cycle literature, the capital share of national income, α, is chosen
to be 0.3; the discount factor, β, is set equal to 0.99; and the capital depreciation
rate, δ, is ﬁxed at 0.025. We then examine the model’s local stability properties for
diﬀerent combinations of χ and θI. In each parametric conﬁguration, the preference
parameter Λ is set to ensure that the steady-state labor hours is equal to 1/3. Figure
1 illustrates the local stability properties of our model, and our third result:
Result 3: Below χ =0 .5 (labor supply elasticity above 2), equilibrium indetermi-
nacy is not possible (not shown).2 However, as long as χ ≥ 0.5, as u ﬃciently
high externality in investment results in local indeterminacy. We denote the
threshold value of the externality θmin
I .
The intuition for this result lies in reconsidering (17). Repeating the experiment,
starting from the steady state, upon an expected increase in the marginal return on
capital, agents will invest more today. Ct and pt fall; and kt+1.,C t+1 and pt+1 increase.
2For χ<. 5, the equilibrium can be either determinate or unstable. In particular, for each χ<. 5,
the model’s steady state is a saddle point below a critical value of θI, a n di sas o u r c ea b o v ei t .T h i s
critical value of θI increases with χ.
8With no income eﬀect, Lt remains unchanged, but wt+1 and Lt+1 increase, which in
turn raises the right-hand side of the euler equation, (17). Therefore, the left-hand
side must increase equally; and this requires a small increase in Lt+1. Looking again
at (9), we see that the higher the χ (or the lower the labor supply elasticity), the
smaller the increase in Lt+1. It turns out that for χ<0.5, the labor supply elasticity
is “too high”, thus Lt+1 rises too much. For χ ≥ 0.5, and lower labor supply elasticity,
a smaller change in Lt+1 results.
The above ﬁnding also helps us to understand our fourth result, which explains
the negative slope of the curve in Figure 1:
Result 4: Equilibrium indeterminacy becomes easier to obtain, in the sense that
lower investment externalities are needed, as the labor supply elasticity falls.








This result is exactly the opposite of that in every other RBC-based indetermi-
nacy model.3 What it means is that as the household’s labor supply becomes less
elastic, lower returns-to-scale in production are required for equilibrium indetermi-
nacy. Intuitively, just like with χ, the change in Lt+1 falls as θI increases. This is
because higher returns-to-scale imply that the same output gain, and increase in the
real wage, can be achieved with a smaller rise in inputs. Therefore, since increases
in both χ and θI lead to smaller changes in Lt+1, the higher the χ, the lower the
returns-to-scale needed to keep the increase in Lt+1 small enough to satisfy (17).
4C o n c l u s i o n
This paper extends MYJ’s analyses, and examines the stability eﬀect of incorporating
no-income-eﬀect preferences into a two-sector real business cycle model with sector-
speciﬁc externalities. While indeterminacy and sunspots are impossible in the MYJ
one-sector economy, their result is overturned here because movements of factors
of production aﬀect the relative price of investment in our two-sector setting. In
addition, due to the non-separability of consumption and leisure in the household’s
utility, the key to generating equilibrium indeterminacy is small movements in labor
3For example, Benhabib and Farmer (1996, p 433), demonstrate the positive relationship between
χ and θ
min
I in a two-sector model with the separable utility function (12).
9supply. Hence, indeterminacy and sunspots are easier to obtain with a lower labor
supply elasticity. In terms of possible extensions, it would be worthwhile to examine
the robustness of our results under a generalized non-separable utility al aJaimovich
(2008) that allows for diﬀerent degrees of income eﬀect on the demand for leisure.
We plan to pursue this research project in the future.
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Figure 1: Local Stability Properties